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NOTES
OLEKSIW v. WEIDENER: ELICITING EXPERT
TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANT DOCTOR
IN A MALPRACTICE SUIT
Following the modern trend, the Ohio Supreme Court in Oleksiw
v. Weidener' ruled that the plaintiff in a malpractice action may
satisfy his need 2 for expert testimony by eliciting such testimony
from the defendant physician under Ohio's "adverse witness stat-
ute."' The majority felt that the purpose of the statute would best
be served by "allowing the examing party to compel all testimony
relevant to the issues in the case .... *" Jurisdictions considering
whether a party can compel the adverse party to render expert
testimony under similar statutes,5 are equally divided.6 Those
taking the view opposite to Oleksiw hold that examination under
such statutes must be limited to the facts within the party's knowl-
edge, and do not require the giving of expert testimony.
7
1. 2 Ohio St.2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965) (two judges dissenting.)
2. It is well settled in all but the most blatant instances of malprac-
tice that the determination whether the defendant physician has failed to
exercise the degree of skill and competence normal to physicians in good
standing in a like or similar community is beyond the competence of a lay
jury. Thus, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to come forward with ex-
pert testimony in support of his case. See, e.g., Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L.
511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp.,
285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941); Bierstein v. Whitman, 360 Pa. 537, 62
A.2d 843 (1949).
3. Omo REV. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 2317.07 (1958), provides in part:
At the instance of the adverse party, a party may be examined as
if under cross-examination, orally, by way of deposition, like any
other witness. . . . The party calling for such examination shall
not thereby be concluded but may rebut it by evidence.
4. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.2d 147, 150, 207 N.E.2d 375, 378.
(original emphasis.)
5. E.g., FED. R. CIV. PROC. 43(b); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2055 (1917);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 60 (1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 9 (1957); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 381 (1963).
6. Accord, Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. App.2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (Su-
preme Ct. 1944); Snyder v. Pantaleo, 143 Conn. 290, 122 A.2d 21 (1956);
State ex rel. Miles v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 167 A.2d 117 (1961); McDermott
v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469 (1964).
Contra, Osborne v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967 (1913); Ericksen v.
Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D.
389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1944).
7. See, e.g., Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App.
1944).
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This Note will examine the rationale underlying these con-
flicting decisions in light of the statutory purpose to determine the
better view. Consideration will also be given to the Pennsylvania
and the federal jurisdictions which have yet to pass upon this point.
Plaintiff Oleksiw alleged that the defendant physicians negli-
gently, and without plaintiff's consent, performed a bilateral fem-
oral arteriogram upon him which resulted in necrosis of the skin.
Plaintiff was undergoing x-ray examinations. A chemical sub-
stance was injected into his bloodstream so that his arteries would
appear as opaque when photographed upon the x-ray plates. The
injection caused extensive discoloration and damage to plaintiff's
skin. He joined a negligence action and technical assault and bat-
tery count. At the trial, defendants were called as for cross-ex-
amination" and asked questions which required expert testimony.
Defendants' objections to this course of questioning were sustained
by the trial court. As a consequence, plaintiff failed to sustain
his burden of proving malpractice due to the absence of expert
testimony showing improper medical practice. The jury found for
the defendants upon the remaining issue of technical assault and
battery. An intermediate appellate court affirmed.9 The Ohio Su-
preme Court reversed holding that such testimony could properly
be elicited.
SOME HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A consideration of the history and problems involved in this
area will be helpful in evaluating the cases on this point. Without
any adverse witness statute, a party, when calling the adverse party
as a witness, had no right to impeach or discredit that witness; nor
could the witness be examined as though on cross-examination. 0
Though one could not impeach his own witness," he could, of
course, diminish the effect of the testimony of his own witness by
furnishing other evidence to the contrary. 12 In State v. Cooper,"
a case not considering a witness called under an adverse witness
statute, it was determined that the party calling a witness would
not be permitted to impeach the witness's character, veracity, or
truth. Nor could the calling party impugn the witness's credibility
by general evidence tending to show the unreliability of such wit-
ness. No party was held to be precluded, however, from proving
the truth of any particular fact by any other competent testimony,
8. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 2317.07 (1958).
9. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 94 Ohio L. Abs. 268, 195 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio
App. 1964).
10. E.g., White v. Southern Oil Stores, Inc., 198 S.C. 173, 17 S.E.2d 151
(1941). This case is representative of the traditional common law view.
There have been occasional deviations.
11. Cavalier v. Bitner, 186 Misc. 848, 60 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Supreme Ct.
1946).
12. E.g., Benbow v. Harvin, 92 S.C. 180, 75 S.E. 414 (1912).
13. 10 N.J. 532, 92 A.2d 786 (1952).
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even though that testimony was in direct conflict with the wit-
ness's testimony.
Thus, one is usually prevented from discrediting or impeaching
the adverse party when called as a witness, in the absence of a
statute 4 so permitting. This restriction would limit any impeach-
ing or discrediting to the cross-examination of what the adverse
party said upon direct examination, if there was any direct exam-
ination. Considering the natural tendency of a party called as a
witness to be partisan, and eliminating the protection of cross-
examination, it is understandable that the common law rule worked
considerable hardship. It often prevented one party from bringing
to light such knowledge as was possessed by his adversary.
The hardship of the common law was recognized by the Su-
preme Court of California. 8 That court discussed the problems
and hardships when construing California's adverse witness stat-
ute:' 6
Prior to [the adverse witness statute's] enactment, a party
might call an adverse party as a witness if he desired to do
so, but he was bound by his testimony in the same manner
and to the same extent as he was by other witnesses called
by him. This rule often worked a hardship upon the liti-
gants, and often prevented the true facts of the case from
being brought out in the evidence .... [The adverse wit-
ness statute] is a statute remedial in character, and as such
should receive a construction by the courts which will car-
ry into effect and accomplish the intent and purpose of the
legislature in enacting it.'
7
Such statutes have been held not to violate any right of a
defendant to remain silent.'8 In a recent New York case the court
said:
[The defendant] must, if called as a witness, respond to vir-
tually all questions aimed at eliciting information, he may
possess relevant to the issues, even though his testimony on
such matters might further the plaintiff's case.' 9
A defendant in a civil action has a duty to testify; the fifth amend-
ment relieves him of this duty to testify in a criminal action.
20
The purpose of the trial is to elicit all relevant and admissible
evidence possible, so that the cause can be justly determined upon
the merits. Any rule of law which prevents this must possess a
14. See note 5, supra.
15. Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 299 Pac. 529 (1931).
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2055 (1917).
17. Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 555-56, 299 Pac. 529,
535.
18. See Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965);
McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 203 N.E.
2d 469 (1964).
19. 15 N.Y.2d at 28, 203 N.E.2d at 474.
20. See Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
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stronger policy consideration.21 It remains to be seen whether the
reasons for not requiring a party to give expert testimony out-
weigh the reasons underlying the requirement of complete dis-
closure of all pertinent information.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
The cases refusing to allow a party to elicit expert testimony
from the other party are singularly devoid of expressed reasons.
22
Perhaps an underlying reason is a feeling that it is "unfair" to
require the defendant to furnish information which will aid the
plaintiff in proving his case; the plaintiff should prove his own
case.23 Such a view has been called the "sporting aspect" of ad-
versary proceedings. 24 This view overlooks the realities of the sit-
uation; the plaintiff is proving his own case by bringing before the
court such knowledge concerning the litigation as the defendant
may possess.
An analysis of the cases will help in determining whether
there is any "unfairness" involved in requiring the defendant to
testify. Assuming that the purpose of a trial is to secure a speedy,
just and inexpensive termination of the litigation, one might ask
what purpose is served by requiring an additional witness to be
brought in to testify. A party already present can supply the
same information. This should be kept in mind when considering
the reasons against compelling a party to render expert testimony.
A reason given by some courts for not allowing a party to
elicit expert testimony from the opposing party is that it would
deprive that party of a property right.25 They argue that one who
has acquired expertise, e.g., physicians, lawyers, engineers, has a
property in his opinions. Such a person should not be required to
render an expert opinion unless he has voluntarily contracted to do
so.26
21. The lawyer-client privilege, doctor-patient privilege, etc. The
preservation of the sanctity of these relationships is deemed more impor-
tant than the quest for the whole truth.
22. E.g., Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
23. See Osborne v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967 (1913). This
feeling of "unfairness" is articulated in Note, 5 So. CAL. L. REV. 448, 450
(1932).
24. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.2d at 150, 207 N.E.2d at 377. See
also McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d at 28,
203 N.E.2d at 474.
25. This is apparently the holding in Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511,
37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944). In that case the court said that when
a party is called as a witness for another party, the witness shall be sub-
ject to the same rules governing cross-examination and examination as
other witnesses. The court further said that one of the established rules
as to examination and cross-examination was that one could not be called
and compelled to give expert testimony, unless he had voluntarily con-
tracted to do so.
26. Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 Atl. 721 (Ct. Err. & App.
1934); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting of Annuities v. Phil-
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Under this concept one may distinguish between a party and a
non-party. When one is hired to give an expert opinion, he is
selling services for which he deserves compensation. On the other
hand, a litigant testifying in a civil trial has a duty27 to reveal all
relevant information which he possesses. Certain "absolute" prop-
erty rights must yield to the state's police power. Further, in the
case of a party, there is no need for him to make a study in order
to familiarize himself with the facts, and no valid objection" can
be made upon this ground. His actions or experience are the sub-
ject of the litigation. Thus, in a malpractice action the defendant
doctor need make no study to render an expert opinion; he has
thoroughly familiarized himself, or should have, when he treated
the patient. All the physician need do is testify whether his treat-
ment deviated from the standards of accepted medical practice.
If a defendant in a malpractice action may truthfully testi-
fy that his conduct conformed to the standard required,
his case is, of course, substantially strengthened and, if he
cannot, so testify, the plaintiff's chances of recovery are
unquestionably increased. In either case, the objective of
the court in doing justice is achieved.
29
New York recognizes that it is a violation of a property right to
compel a non-party to render expert testimony.30 This did not
preclude the court in McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat
Hosp. from compelling a party to render expert testimony. It is
submitted that this distinction is sound.
The property right argument is further weakened when one
considers that nearly half of the jurisdictions in the United States
hold that one can be compelled to give expert testimony without
having contracted to do so.8 1 They do not recognize any property
adelphia, 216 Pa. 439, 105 AtL. 630 (1918). This latter case distinguishes
between a private litigant compelling expert testimony without compen-
sation, and the state so compelling. Dicta of that case says that the state
does not have to compensate the expert for his services. Neither case con-
siders an adverse witness statute, and the nuances of this latter distinc-
tion are beyond the scope of this note.
27. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.2d at 149, 207 N.E.2d at 377.
28. See, e.g., Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 397, 25 Am. Rep. 611
(1875); Flinn v. Prarie County, 60 Ark., 204, 207, 29 S.W. 459, 460 (1895).
29. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d at
28, 203 N.E.2d at 474.
30. People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 233, 72
N.E.2d 165 (1947).
31. See, e.g., Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 25 Am. Rep. 611 (1875);
Larimer County v. Lee, 3 Colo. App., 32 Pac. 841 (1873); Dixon v. People,
168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1182
(1961). Most cases on this point, as illustrated by Dement, differentiate
between instances where the expert either knows of the facts or is posed
a hypothetical question, and when the expert must make a study of the
problem involved in order to answer the question posed. In the latter
instance, the courts are agreed that they cannot compel an expert to make




right. In Ex parte Dement32 the defendant doctor had examined a
murder victim. At the trial of one Barnard, the purported mur-
derer, Dr. Dement was called as a witness for the state. The doc-
tor gave testimony that he had examined the victim; he refused to
give his expert opinion as to the nature, character, and effect of the
wound, however, because he had not been remunerated for giving
his professional opinion. He was found guilty of contempt of court
and this was sustained upon appeal. The court imposed a duty to
give all relevant knowledge and made no distinction between fact
or expert opinion.
Such cases draw no distinction between an expert and an ordi-
nary witness, holding that all witnesses have a duty to inform the
court of all relevant knowledge, be it fact or opinion, which they
possess.3 3 Other cases have refused to grant any compensation
above the statutory witness fee to an expert witness rendering
expert testimony.34 From the preceding discussion, it can be seen
that many jurisdictions provide no special treatment for expert
witnesses. The expert witness is required to give all knowledge
which he possesses concerning a lawsuit when called upon to do so
by the court. These jurisdictions refuse to recognize any property
right which overrides the public duty to testify. There is even less
reason to protect an expert who is a party. Because of this split of
authority, the property right reason for refusing to compel an ad-
verse party to render expert testimony is open to serious question.
As will later be seen, there are jurisdictions which refuse to recog-
nize any property right when a party is seeking to discover expert
opinion from the opposing party.
Any claim of unfairness in allowing the plaintiff to establish
his case by means of the defendant's expert testimony has been
answered by those cases which allow the eliciting of expert testi-
mony from a party. "If his [the expert party's] testimony will
provide facts which will aid the court in arriving at a just decision,
he has the duty to testify. Any loss to the sporting aspect of ad-
versary proceeding would be outweighed by the benefit to the judi-
cial system."3 5 Again we return to the premise that all relevant
information should be revealed, barring some superior policy con-
sideration to the contrary.
No jurisdiction construing an adverse witness statute has ever
held that it is unfair to compel a party in a civil trial to reveal all
32. Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 25 Am. Rep. 611 (1875).
33. See, e.g., Ex parte Dement, supra note 32; Flinn v. Prarie County,
60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895). This is the reasoning advanced by most
cases so holding. It must be emphasized that not every expert may be
compelled to come to court and testify; like any other witness, he must
have some relationship with the case at bar.
34. See, e.g., Mount v. Welsh, 118 Or. 568, 247 Pac. 815 (1926).
35. Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St.2d at 150, 207 N.E.2d at 377. The
New York court in McDermott expressed virtually the same thought, 15
N.Y.2d at 28, 203 N.E.2d at 474.
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of the facts within his knowledge concerning the matter at issue.36
All jurisdictions agree that such statutes allow at least this much.3 7
It has been held that the plaintiff can make out his case upon the
facts to which the defendant testifies.38 Decisions which have al-
lowed an adverse party to elicit expert testimony do not draw a
distinction between fact and opinion. They allow the plaintiff to
prove his case by means of defendant's expert testimony.
There is nothing unfair about such a practice. Unlike
his counterpart in a criminal prosecution, the defendant in
a civil suit has no inherent right to remain silent or, once
on the stand, to answer only those inquiries which will have
no adverse effect upon his case. Rather, he must, if called
as a witness, respond to virtually all questions aimed at
eliciting information, he may possess relevant to the issues,
even though his testimony on such matters might further
the plaintiff's case. We cannot agree with the suggestion
that it is somehow neither sporting nor consistent with the
adversary system to allow a party to prove his case through
his opponent's own testimony. .... 89
The cases which imply that it is "unfair" to require the defend-
ant to give testimony which might tend to prove the plaintiff's case
do not say why it is so. Apparently these courts would rather
protect the defendant and litigate the case upon an incomplete set
of facts. In light of the recent liberal interpretations of the ad-
verse witness statutes, it is submitted that the "unfairness" argu-
ment should fail. When the previously discussed property right
argument is dismissed, the restrictive cases give no reason why a
party should be privileged to remain silent and allow a judgment
not warranted by the complete facts. Is it not more unfair to have a
judgment unwarranted by the whole truth, than to compel a party
to tell the whole truth, however damaging? The liberal cases recog-
nize this, and hold that justice is best served by allowing a party to
elicit both fact and expert opinion from his adversary.40
Although not considered in any of the decided cases, it might
be argued that it is prejudicial to require a party to aid in proving
his adversary's case. In legal usage, prejudice or prejudicial are
rather imprecise terms embodying several different meanings.
Strictly speaking, it means a preconceived opinion or a leaning
toward one side of a cause for some reason other than its justice.
41
36. E.g., Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (Ct. Err. & App.
1944).
37. E.g., Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963).
38. E.g., Hall v. Horak, 329 Mich. 16, 44 N.W.2d 848 (1950); Waller v.
Sloan, 225 Mich. 600, 196 N.W. 347 (1923); Langford v. Isenhuth, 28 S.D.
451, 134 N.W. 889 (1912). This is undoubtedly true in most jurisdictions.
39. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d at
28, 203 N.E.2d at 473.
40. Id. at 20, 203 N.E.2d at 469.
41. Willis v. State, 12 Ga. 444, 449 (1852); Taylor v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 146 Kan. 841, 844, 73 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1937).
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It is manifest that we are not here faced with this sort of preju-
dice.
Prejudicial could also mean adverse, unfavorable, or disadvan-
tageous to a party's cause. It is equally obvious that evidence
should not be excluded upon this ground.
If such evidence were excluded because it had a prejudicial
tendency against the defendant (that is, if it tended to in-
fluence the jury to render a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff), then plaintiff could never make out a case. [A] court
cannot be convicted of error because of that circumstance.
42
It is suggested that for purposes of present discussion, a ruling
should be considered prejudicial if it would naturally and probably
bring about a wrong result 43 or if it would erroneously affect the
jury in reaching its verdict.4 4 A defendant doctor's expert testi-
mony as to the propriety of his professional conduct is not preju-
dicial by this standard. A liberal interpretation of an adverse
witness statute would help to prevent an erroneous result by al-
lowing all relevant information to be brought before the trier of
fact. A wrong decision would be less likely to occur since all
available testimony would be put before the jury.
A further reason which favors the allowing of a party to elicit
expert testimony as in Oleksiw was brought out by the New York
court in McDermott:
The importance of enabling the plaintiff to take the testi-
mony of the defendant doctor as to both 'fact' and 'opin-
ion' is accentuated by recognition of the difficulty inherent
in securing 'independent' expert witnesses. It is not al-
ways a simple matter to have an expert, a doctor in this
case, condemn in open court the practice of another, par-
ticularly if the latter is a leader in his field. In conse-
quence, the plaintiff's only recourse in many cases may be
to question the defendant doctor as an expert in the hope
that he will thereby be able to establish his malpractice
claim.
45
This is an express judicial recognition of the problem of securing
expert testimony in a malpractice case. Thus, the practicalities of
the situation also urge a liberal interpretation of adverse witness
statutes.
46
A collateral reason why one should not be compelled to give
42. Ingram v. Prarie Block Coal Co., 319 Mo. 644, 658, 5 S.W.2d 413,
418 (1928).
43. State v. Farrar, 103 Kan. 774, 776, 176 Pac. 987, 988 (1919).
44. Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Hillman, 111 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
45. 15 N.Y.2d at 27, 28, 203 N.E.2d at 474.
46. For a controversial treatment of the problem of securing expert
medical testimony in general, see Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied:
The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VL. L. REv. 250 (1956).
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expert testimony is given in Ex parte Roelker 47 wherein the court
said:
When a person has knowledge of any fact pertinent to an
issue to be tried, he may be compelled to attend as a wit-
ness. In this all stand upon equal ground. But to compel a
person to attend merely because he is accomplished in a
particular science, art, or profession, would subject the
same individual to be called upon, in every cause in which
his department of knowledge is to be solved.
4 8
This is the "inconvenience" argument. The case goes on to dis-
cuss the hardship of compelling an eminent expert to expose himself
to the rigors of travel and to expend his time merely for ordinary
witness fees.
It is patent that this argument has no application to an expert
who is a party.4 9 There are sound reasons for distinguishing be-
tween a nonparty who is compelled to render expert testimony and
a party who is compelled to render such testimony.50 No incon-
venience is involved. The expert party is already present and in-
volved in the litigation.51
McDermott noted a possible abuse of the right to examine the
opposing party as an expert.5 2 It is possible that a plaintiff, acting
in bad faith, might name an expert as a defendant merely to obtain
an expert witness. This possibility did not preclude the New York
court from adopting the liberal view, and it is submitted that this
result is sound. To deny a right to everyone merely because there
is opportunity for abuse would imply that the law is incapable of
coping with those who abuse their rights. Tort remedies such as
abuse of process, 53 judicial remedies such as contempt, and sanc-
tions by the bar associations could be quite effective to stem any
perversion of the statute.
THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION
At least one jurisdiction distinguishes between an expert opin-
ion based on a hypothetical question 54 and one based upon a factual
question. 55 In Hunder v. Rindlaub0 the court refused to allow the
plaintiff to pose a hypothetical question concerning what the
47. 20 Fed. Cas. 1092 (D. Mass. 1854).
48. Id. at 1092-93. (Emphasis added.)
49. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20,
29, 203 N.E.2d 469, 474-75.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Id. at 30, n.5, 203 N.E.2d at 475, n.5.
53. See PROSSER, TORTS 876 (3d ed. 1964). Note the distinction be-
tween, as well as the overlapping of, this tort and malicious prosecution.
54. Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931).
55. Harden v. Mischel, 63 N.D. 122, 246 N.W. 646 (1933); Sax Motor
Co. v. Belfield Farmers' Union Elev. Co., 62 N.D. 727, 245 N.W. 488 (1932).
56. 61 N.D. 389, 237 N.W. 915 (1931).
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defendant would do if he encountered a puncture injury to an eye;
there had already been testimony to the effect that the eye had
been pierced. Yet in Sax Motor Co. v. Belfield Farmers' Union
Elevator Co.,57 the same court held that it was proper for the plain-
tiff to ask the defendant's elevator manager what the value of the
grain at issue was; this question involved the rendering of an ex-
pert opinion. Likewise in Harden v. Mischel,58 the same bench
permitted the plaintiff to inquire of the defendant as to the value
of certain cars involved in the action, again a question requiring an
expert opinion. The court in Sax Motor Co. expressly stated that
their holding in Hunder was limited to the asking of hypothetical
questions.
5 9
The type of hypothetical question which the North Dakota
court objected to was a hypothetical question based upon testimony
heard and not a question based upon an assumed state of facts.60
"Questions calling for expert opinions should be framed so as not to
call upon the witness to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, the
preponderance of evidence, or [to?] determine controverted ques-
tions of fact." '61 This is objectionable since the jury alone are to
determine what facts are proved.6 2 It is submitted that the North
Dakota court would allow the eliciting of expert testimony from a
defendant physician based on a properly phrased hypothetical ques-
tion.
Most of the opinions which do not permit one to elicit expert
testimony from the adverse party do not mention the nature of the
question by which the testimony is sought to be elicited. Therefore,
it is impossible to determine whether the North Dakota view repre-
sents a general rule.63
THE PENNSYLVANIA AND FEDERAL CASES
The question presented in Oleksiw v. Weidener has never aris-
en in Pennsylvania, although Pennsylvania does have an adverse
witness statute.64 A federal case6 5 has expressly declined to rule
whether or not Federal Rule 43 (b) may be used to compel a party to
render expert testimony. Both Pennsylvania6 6 and the federal
57. 62 N.D. 727, 245 N.W. 488 (1932).
58. 63 N.D. 122, 246 N.W. 646 (1933).
59. Sax Motor Co. v. Belfield Farmers' Union Elev. Co., 62 N.D. 727,
731, 245 N.W. 488, 489-90.
60. Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 417, 237 N.W. 915, 927.
61. Ibid.
62. McKELvEY, EVIDENCE 357 (5th ed. 1944). See generally MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE 29-34 (1954) (detailed analysis of the problems and policies in-
volved in this area).
63. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1187, 1188 (1963).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 381 (1963).
65. Thompson v. Lillehei, 273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959).
66. Decker v. Pohlidal, 22 Pa. D.&C.2d 631 (C.P. 1960).
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courts6 7 will allow a party to elicit expert opinion from an opposing
party during the discovery process.
In Decker v. Pohlidal,6 8 a malpractice action, the plaintiff
sought to discover6 9 an expert opinion from defendant physician.
The defendant objected claiming that the plaintiff could not ask the
defendant doctor to express his expert opinion on any matter. It
was further urged that no private litigant could ask a doctor for
an expert opinion unless a bargain was reached whereby the doctor
agreed to do so. Pennsylvania Co. for the Ins. on Lives and Grant-
ing of Annuities v. Philadelphia,70 was cited as authority for this.
This contention was rejected by the Decker court.
We cannot sustain the defendant's objections on this
ground. The foregoing expert witness rule is inapplicable
where defendant-doctor, himself an expert, is on trial for
malpractice. In such a situation no sound distinction can be
drawn between questioning him concerning his opinion,
since fact and opinion are inextricably intermingled on the
fundamental issue as to whether defendant-doctor departed
from accepted standards in diagnosing and treating plain-
tiff's injuries.
71
The New York court in McDermott also expressed this thought:
It is at least arguable that the doctor's knowledge of the
proper medical practice and his possible awareness of his
deviation from that standard in the particular case are, in
a real sense, as much matters of 'fact' as are the diagnosis
and examination he made or the treatment upon which he
settled.
72
This is another possible reason why a party in a malpractice action
should be required to give an expert opinion.
Federal cases have allowed discovery of expert opinion.73 A
distinction is made between discovery of the opinion of an expert
employed by a party to make a study of the controversy, and dis-
covery of the expert opinion of one of the parties or a managing
agent of one of the parties. 74 This distinction is based upon the
conclusion that obtaining the opinion of an expert employed by a
party to make a study for the purpose of the litigation would be an
67. See, e.g., Bugen v. Friedman, 10 F.R.D. 231 (E.D. Pa. 1951); cf.
Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957) (eliciting expert testi-
mony from managing agent of defendant.)
68. 22 Pa. D.&C.2d 631 (C.P. 1960).
69. This was done pursuant to PA. R. CIV. PROC. 4007.
70. 216 Pa. 439, 105 Atl. 630 (1918).
71. Decker -v. Pohlidal, 22 Pa. D.&C.2d at 639-40. PA. R. CiV. PROC.
§ 4020 provides that depositions taken under § 4007, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence, may be used against a party who was duly
notified of the taking of depositions.
72. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d at
27, 203 N.E.2d at 473.
73. E.g., Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957).
74. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594, 596 (W.D.
Pa. 1947); Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237, 239 (D.R.I. 1957).
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unfair taking of property.75 Obviously, this reasoning does not
prevent the discovery of an expert opinion from a party.
SOME STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and in-
expensive determination of every action." It is submitted that a
court determining whether Rule 43(b) allows the eliciting of expert
testimony from a party, might give this mandate of construction
great weight. If the defendant, while under oath, admits that he
had departed from the accepted standard of practice, speed of trial
is increased, expense is reduced, and justice served. Thus con-
struing Rule 43(b) to permit eliciting of expert testimony from an
adverse party would comply with the mandate of Rule 1.
As previously mentioned, Pennsylvania has an adverse witness
statute.7 6 No cases, however, involving the expert testimony of a
party have been found. The Statutory Construction Act 77 seems to
require a strict construction of Pennsylvania's adverse witness
statute. Section 557 (8) provides:
All provisions of a law of the classes hereafter enumerated
shall be strictly construed:....
(8) Provisions enacted prior to the effective date of
this law which are in derrogation of the common law.
Pennsylvania's adverse witness statute was enacted prior to the
effective date of the Statutory Construction Act and is in derroga-
tion of the common law.
78
Sections 531 and 551 may limit the effect of section 557. Sec-
tion 531 provides:
In the construction of the laws of this Commonwealth,
the rules set forth in this article shall be observed, unless
the application of such rules would result in a construction
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.
Section 551 provides:
When the words of the law are not explicit, the inten-
tion of the legislature may be ascertained by considering,
among other matters (1) the occasion and necessity for the
law; (2) the circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to be at-
tained; (5) the former law. . . ; (6) the consequences of a
75. Ibid., see also, Lewis v. United Airlines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp.
21 (W.D, Pa. 1940).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 381 (1963). This was enacted in May 23,
1887, and amended by the Act of March 30, 1911. As will later be seen,
these dates could have great significance due section 557(8) of the Statu-
tory Construction Act.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 501-601 (1963), Act of May 28, 1937.
Note this date; it was enacted subsequent to :the adverse witness statute.





In light of the above, it is submitted that section 557 (8) would
not preclude a Pennsylvania court from adopting the liberal view
as embodied in Oleksiw and McDermott. Since the adverse witness
statutes are remedial in character, 79 the Pennsylvania courts might
construe their statute liberally, holding that the legislature so in-
tended.
None of the so-called adverse witness statutes expressly pro-
hibit the eliciting of expert testimony; indeed, they are silent on
the subject.8 0 The Maryland court in State ex rel. Miles v. Brain-
in"' stated that a possible reason for the differing interpretations,
was the minor differences in wording.82 At least, the Maryland
court held that the broad language in the Maryland statute8 3 was a
reason for not following cases which deny the right to elicit expert
testimony from an adverse party. 4  Despite the differences in
wording, the language of the statutes does not prohibit the elicit-
ing of expert opinion. The Maryland statute which allows one to
interrogate, contradict and impeach a witness grants no more than
do the statutes which allow the interrogation of a party to proceed
as if on cross-examination. It is submitted that the different re-
sults which the courts have reached are attributable more to court
attitudes than to any differences in wording.
CONCLUSION
It is suggested that the result reached by the Ohio court in
Oleksiw is sound. While it may be quite optimistic for the plain-
tiff to call the defendant doctor as an expert,8 5 the better reasoned
cases allow him to do so. The obvious purpose of adverse witness
statutes is to produce all the pertinent and relevant evidence that
is available.86 By allowing expert testimony to be elicited from a
party, the statutory purpose is best served. The property right and
"inconvenience" arguments are weak when it is remembered that it
is a party who is involved. Furthermore, the restrictive cases have
given no reason why it is less "unfair" to allow a party to remain
79. Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 299 Pac. 529 (1931).
80. See the comprehensive citations in 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 916 (3d
ed. 1940) as well as the cumulative supplement contained therein.
81. 224 Md. 156, 167 A.2d 117 (1961).
82. Id. at 156 n.2, 167 A.2d at 117 n.2.
83. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 9 provides in part that one calling an
adverse party may "interrogate . .. contradict and impeach [him]." Other
statutes such as N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 81-11 provide for examination
in the nature of a cross-examination. Since one can impeach and contra-
dict a witness upon cross-examination, it is submitted that there is no
difference in the effect of the statutes.
84. State ex rel. Miles v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 160-61, 167 A.2d 117,
119 (1961).
85. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20,
30 N.E.2d 469, 475.
86. State ex rel. Miles v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 161, 167 A.2d 117, 119.
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silent and withhold important information from the trier of fact.
No overriding reason why a party should be privileged to remain
silent under these circumstances is given. The doctrine of Oleksiw
should soon prevail in the Pennsylvania and federal courts.
MICHAEL R. CONNOR
